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ABSTRACT 
Correlations between legislative support scores and 
presidential popularity do not accurately reflect the relationship 
between p ublic opinion and presidential influence in Congress. 
Presidents make strategic choices to expend their public prestige to 
obtain congressional approval of programmatic initiatives. Previous 
studies have ignored such choices as well as other features of the 
strategic environnent which tend to lower the apparent legislative 
success rates of popular presidents. A model of presidential and 
congressional behavior is proposed and it is estimated that a one 
percent increase in a president's public support level increases 
the president's legislative approval rate by approximately one 
percent (holding program size fixed). 
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1. Introduction 
Elections, it has long been recognized, do not provide 
American presidents with clear policy mandates. In part this is 
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because the voice of the electorate is often ambiguous. Elections are 
a good indicator of voters' general state of mind--whether they are 
pleased or displeased by the overall course of government policy--but 
they give legislators little specific guidance on how existing 
programs should be changed or what new programs are needed. 
Presidents will read into their electoral maj orities what they like, 
but Congress is under no obligation to take the same interpretation. 
The president's legislative program represents one 
interpretation of what the public demands; the congressional response 
to it represents another. Political scientists have traditionally 
shown a healthy skepticism toward the claims of congressmen that they 
merely give the public what it wants, but this impulse does exist and 
is reinforced by certain institutional arrangements--most notably, but 
not exclusively, elections. In this paper we will try to determine 
how and to what extent the fate of the president's legislative program 
rests on public opinion, We argue that previous studies have 
understated the extent to which congressional support of presidential 
policy initiatives depends on the president's public standing, but 
have also neglected some of the perils inherent in a presidential 
leadership style that rests on the president's personal popularity. 
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Much of the argument is familiar. Twenty years ago R ichard 
Neustadt identified "public prestige" as a source of presidential 
influence in Congress. While he points out that public support for a 
president "operates mostly in the background as a conditioner, not the 
determinant of what Washingtonians will do about a President's 
request, "  Neustadt also suggests that "the weaker his apparent popular 
support, the more his cause in Congress may depend on negatives at his 
disposal like the veto, or 'impounding."' (Neustadt, 1980: 65)
The connection between a president's public prestige and his 
influence in Congress is, according to Neustadt, a consequence of 
their sharing of "publics." The relevant public varies from issue to 
issue, On matters of little concern to most citizens, congressmen may 
be effectively shielded from public opinion. Occasionally members of 
the public may not be presidential or congressional "constituents" in 
the narrow sense at al l. Foeign policy, for instance, concerns allied 
leaders and "world opinion"; congressmen may be able to ignore this 
public, but the president surely cannot. Since their p ublics do not 
overlap entirely, there need not be any one-to-one relationship 
between the president's overall popularity and his congressional 
influence. 
Neustadt does not attempt to quantify this relationship. In 
fact, he deplores the tendency to "keep scores" of presidential 
initiatives (Neustadt, 1955: 1017) and stresses that a president's 
public prestige cannot be translated into precise numbers, even by the 
Gallup poll. Personal popularity and public prestige, he warns are 
not the same thing: in assessing the president's public standing 
Washingtonians "are no less concerned with what he is liked for, than 
with how many like him." (Neustadt, 1980: 65) The relationship 
between public support for a president and congressional passage of 
his program is subtle and is unlikely to be captured by simple-minded 
quantification. 
Where Neustadt feared to tread, others have been less 
cautious. Edwards (1976) marshalls the most extensive quantitative 
evidence on the relationship between public approval of the president 
and presidential influence in Congress. His results are decidedly 
mixed. On domestic issues, for example, he find that Gallup 
presidential approval ratings are correlated with Congressional 
Quarterly (CQ) presidential support scores in the Senate but not in 
the House. There is a much stronger correlation between presidential 
popularity among Democrats in the electorate and presidential support 
among Democrats in Congress, but this mostly reflects a tendency of 
Democratic partisans to approve of Democratic presidents and 
disapprove of Republican presidents and a corresponding tendency of 
Democratic congressmen to support the programs advocated by Democratic 
presidents and to oppose those advocated by Republican presidents. 
Controlling for the president's party, Edwards even finds a negative 
partial correlation between presidential popularity among Republicans 
in the public and presidential support among Republicans in Congress. 
This study, however, leaves much roan for additional work. 
First, Edwards' measure·of congressional support for the president's 
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program involves a sampling of issues which is likely to exaggerate 
the extent of presidential influence in Congress. CQ support scores 
are based on roll call votes on "key issues" on which the president 
has taken a clear position. They exclude measures which the president 
supported but which Congress refused to consider or on which no final 
floor action was taken. The bias in CQ support scores is suggested by 
an examination of their levels. Even at the height of the Watergate 
scandal, when Nixon's popularity had fallen below 3� and, according 
to contemporary press reports, the administration's program was 
stalled in Congress, his CQ support scores remained above 5�. 
Regression estimates computed using a censored sample such as this 
will be attenuated. (Heckman, 1979) The same is true of 
correlational measures. 
The second problem with Edwards' analysis is his reliance on 
correlation coefficients to gauge the relationship between public 
support for the president and congressional approval of his 
legislative program. Though comparison of correlational measures can 
be suggestive, this method is, for most purposes, inferior to 
obtaining the relevant regression estimates. There is great advantage 
in precisely specifying what model we are estimating so we can decide 
whether or not the model is consistent with the data. Edwards does 
propose a very simple two-equation model, but this model is seriously 
underspecified and, in any event, not identified without some overly 
restrictive (and unstated) assumptions. 1 
Finally, though Edwards is obviously interested in testing 
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some propositions in Presidential Power, he does not perform tests of 
statistical signi ficance or even report standard errors for any of his 
parameter estimates. He argues that significance tests are 
inappropriate because the entire population--all congressmen and 
senators--was analyzed. (Edwards, 1980: 113) This misunderstanding 
stems from his failure to specify the behavioral model he is 
estimating. Since congressional behavior is to some degree random 
(i.e., dependent upon factors not explicitly included in the model, 
but whose effects are captured by an error term with some probability 
distribution), each observation should be though of as one realization 
of a stochastic process. Since Edwards does not report standard 
errors for any of his parameter estimates it is impossible to judge 
their reliability. 
This paper attempts to correct these deficiencies by 
developing a more completely specified model and estimating its 
parameters. It is our view that previous studies have been hindered 
primarly by the use of inadequate models rather than limitations of 
the data, though these limitations are serious. We show that it is 
possible to find stronger connections between presidential influence 
in Congress and public support for the president--using the same types 
of opinion and roll call data as Edwards and others--if a richer 
specification of presidental-congressional interaction is employed. 
The ideas motivating the development of the model are discussed in 
section 2 and the corresponding econometric specification is explained 
in the following section. The data used to estimate the model are 
described in section 4. The estimation results are presented in 
section 5 and some implications of these results are discussed in 
section 6.  
2 . Sources o f  Presidential Influence in Congress 
By "presidential influence in Congress" we mean the 
president's ability to obtain passage of his legislative proposals by 
Congress. His ability to do this depends on what he requests--the 
form and content of his legislative program--and on the strategiic 
situation in Congress. Neither variable lends itself to precise 
definition or measurement. 
Presidential influence cannot be detached from the content of 
the president's program, for it is the content of the program which 
inevitably provokes political controversy. Congressmen will differ 
among themselves and with the president over what are the proper 
objectives of government policy. When they are in agreement over 
policy objectives they will differ over the means by which an 
objective is to be reached or the priority to be assigned to an 
objective in the face of scarce government resources. Influence may 
enable the president to obtain approval of programs whose content is 
opposed by a substantial fraction of Congress. It is interesting only 
insofar as it allows the president to substitute his policy objectives 
and priorities for those of Congress. 
To determine whether presidental influence had been exercised 
in obtaining congressional approval of a presidental legislative 
request, one would need to know the extent of congressional opposition 
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to the content of that proposal: where there is little prior 
opposition to the content of a proposal, there is no need for 
influence, Similarly, an unambitious legislative program will not 
provide a test of presidential influence in Congress. A high 
congressional approval rate of presidential requests could indicate 
considerable success in overcoming congressional opposition or merely 
reluctance to press Congress for passage of controversial measures. 
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In operational terms, large programs--as measured by the sheer 
quantity of presidental legislative requests--are likely to be 
ambitious ones and vice-versa. When a president offers a large number 
of policy proposals the likelihood on Congress approving a specific 
proposal, if only because of time constraints, falls. 
In trying to persuade congressmen to support legislation they 
might otherwise be inclined to oppose on the merits, the president 
must resort to bargaining and persuasion. The resources available for 
bargaining define what we have called the strategic situation. 
Presidential resources include patronage, perquisites, and similar 
incentives. Public opinion is another important feature of the 
strategic situation, though it is less obvious how the president might 
use this resource to increase his influence in Congress. 
The president's election victory is of surprisingly little 
help to him in pushing his program throught Congress. Rejection at 
the polls leaves the minority party disorganized and disheartened, but 
even a landslide defeat may not strip it of the resources necessary to 
resist the president's policy initiatives. At the beginning of his 
term a president typically enjoys a short honeymoon with Congress 
during which the opposition party yields some of its prerogatives. 
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But soon relations between the president and his opponents in Congress 
are restored to the usual pattern of bargaining and persuasion with 
each side bringing its full array of political resources to battle. 
The problem, of course, is that the president, even with 
public opinion on his side, has few sanctions at his disposal that 
might make Congress more cooperative. Congressmen, either of his own 
party or the opposition, do not owe their election to him, nor, if 
past experience is any guide, can he do much to remove them, 
Presidential attempts to unseat uncooperative congressmen have a 
notoriously bad track record. Presidential coattails, if ever strong, 
are now so weak that, according to Burnham (1975: 412), incumbent 
congressmen have become quite effectively insulated from the electoral 
effects • • • of adverse presidential landslides. " A congressmen's 
best chance to ensure his reelection is through constituency service 
and credit-claiming and it will probably not make much difference to 
the voters how faithfully he has supported the president's program. 
If congressmen need not fear reelection defeat or party 
discipline if they oppose presidental policy initiatives, how can the 
president use public opinion as a resource to increase his influence 
in Congress? The connection, we believe, rests not on any calculation 
by the congressmen of how his constituents will judge his support of 
or opposition to the president's program, but on a sense of "common 
fate112 among congressmen based on their understanding of how the 
10 
public holds government accountable for policy failures. The degree 
to which congressional election outcomes depend on aggregate national 
fluctuations will determine the extent of electoral interdependence 
among congressmen. The strength of the national component in 
congressional voting has varied over time (Stokes, 1975) and recently 
ap�ears to be on the decline, but it still exists and is something 
congressmen worry about. These swings register public dissatisfaction 
with the course of government policy. An unfavorable public judgment 
will mean a loss of seats for the party which currently occupies the 
White House but will, to a lesser degree, damage the reelection 
prospects of all incumbents. Incumbents will be rewarded if the 
public approves of their performance, though it is in the nature of 
public opinion that punishment for failure will be swifter and more 
severe than reward for success (Bloom and Price, 1975). Finally, the 
best barometer of public dissatisfaction with government performance 
between elections is the president's public standing as measured, for 
example, by the Gallup poll. 
Taken together, these characteristics of public opinion 
describe a system that is performance oriented and in this case it is 
the president's performance that matters. As an institution Congress 
is ill-suited as a source of programmatic initiatives. Congress 
counts on the president to set its agenda in the form of a legislative 
program which it can "respond to or react against." (Neustadt, 1980: 
7) Congressmen realize that if the president's program fails, the 
public will, in part at least, also count it as a failure of Congress. 
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Inasmuch as congressmen share a "common fate" it is the same fate that 
awaits the president and this connection promotes congressional 
support for the program of a popular president. 
We recognize, however, that the link between a president's 
public prestige and congressmen's electoral fortunes is supported by 
relatively weak institutional incentives, When confronted by a choice 
between supporting a popular president and the clear interests of his 
constituents, the president's public prestige is a poor match for his 
or her constituents' interests. But on many issues contituency 
interests are not easily perceived or irrelevant. When constituency 
opinion on a particular bill is unformed or the constituency interest 
is not apparent, congressmen are more likely to ,defer to a popular 
president or to go along with the party leadership. 
Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of the argument. 
The strategic situation, which encompasses, among other things, 
presidential prestige and presidential party strength in Congress, 
ultimately rests on the retrospective judgments of the electorate 
about policy performance. The president formulates his program with 
the strategic situation in mind, When his position is strong--as, for 
example, when public opinion is on his side--he can use his influence 
to extract policy commitments from Congress that would not be possible 
in other situations. The president also takes into account the likely 
congressional response to his program initiatives; this reflects 
learning (did Congress approve earlier requests?) as well as 
expectations of future conduct, But the sort of program the president 
Figure 1 
MODEL OF PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE IN CONGRESS 
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Approval 
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and lags 
finally submits to Congress (specifically, the size of the program) 
will affect its chances of passage, Hence, program formulation and 
program approval are simultaneously determined. 
Nonstrategic factors also influence formulation of the 
president's program and may, in fact, counter the strategic factors. 
Poor policy performance, for example, may weaken the president's 
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strategic situation while it creates demands for policy initiatives to 
remedy the poor performance, Here lies the dilemma for the president: 
his influence is likely to be weakest when policy demands are 
greatest. This is a point we return to in the concluding section. 
3. Econometric Specification 
Translating informal institutional descriptions into a set of 
estimating equations is a difficult task and it is not necessary, or 
even advisable, to model all of the interactions in Figure 1 
simultaneously, Instead we concentrate on the effects of strategic 
factors--especially public support for the president--on congressional 
passage of the president's awareness of these strategic factors in 
formulating his program. The effect of public opinion on presidental 
success in Congress cannot be analyzed in isolation, but we restrict 
our attention to the simplest and most obvious characteristic of the 
president's legislative program: its size. 
The president's program in year t consists of Nt requests 
(t = 1, ,,, , T) .  Congressional support for the president on any 
• 
particular request, denoted Yit' depends on the total quantity of 
presidential requests for legislative action (Nt) ,  the strategic 
situation in Congress (POPt, PARTYt, dt) ,  and unmeasured factors 
specific to the bill (captured by the error term uit) :
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a0 + a1log Nt + a2POPt + a 3PARTYt 
+ a4dt + uit 
(1) 
Here POPt is the president's level of public support, PARTYt is the 
strength of the president's party in Congress, and dt is a dummy 
variable indicating the first year of a new administration. (Variables 
are described in greater detail in section 4.) The particular 
functional form was arrived upon after sane experimentation, though a 
simple linear specification performed almost as well. We anticipate 
a1 < O since a large number of presidential requests is likely to
generate congressional resistance. 
Next, we postulate that the number of requests in the 
president's program will depend on his prior experience with Congress 
(measured by the fraction of his requests Congress approved in the 
previous year, denoted Yt_1) ,  the party of the president (REPPRESt) ,
and a dummy variable for new admini�trations (dt) :
Po+ P1Yt-1<1 - dt) + P2dt 
+ P3REPPRESt + Vt 
(2) 
Here we anticipate p1 > O since the president is likely to expand his 
program if he was previously successful in obtaining congressional 
passage of his program. 
We do not observe the actual level of congressional support 
• 
for the president on any bill (Yit) ,  but only whether that bill passes 
or not. (Roll call voting data might be used to measure support on 
bills which came to a vote, but, as we indicated at the outset, much 
of the president's program never reaches this stage. We prefer the 
similar approach of only using the discrete outcome of passage or 
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nonpassage.) Let Yit be a binary indicator which takes the value one 
if Congress approves the ith presidential request in year t and takes 
the value zero otherwise (i = 1, ••. , Nt>• A request is approved if
congressional support for that request exceeds some threshold 
necessary to ensure passage of the request. Since we have free choice 
• of origin and scale for Yit' we may set this threshold equal to zero: 
1 if 0 
0 if 
• 
yit { 0 
Last, we need to specify the joint distribution of the errors: the u's 
and v's are assumed to be joint normally distributed; the u's each 
have zero mean and variance equal to 1 - p2 and are distributed 
independently of one another; vt has mean zero and variance a;
; and 
E(uitvs) = pav if t = s or zero if t = I s. This completes our 
dicussion of the model specification. 
Equations (1) and (2) were estimated using the method of 
Rivers and Vuong (1984) . Under our assumptions, equation (2) is 
already written in reduced form so the marginal likelihood for Nt is 
maximized by applying ordinary least squares, The conditional 
likelihood for Yit given Nt is of the probit form, augmented by the 
reduced from errors from (2) : 
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Prob(Yit = l l Nt) = (3) 
ci>(a + a1 log Nt + a2POPt + a3PARTYt + a4REPPRESt + p vtf av) 
where cf>(•) denotes the cumulative normal distribution function. 
,. 
Replacing Vt by the least squares residuals vt in (3) and applying 
probit analysis yields the two-stage conditional maximum likelihood 
estimator. This estimator is particularly convenient since, as Rivers 
,. 
and Vuong (1984) point out, the t-statistic associated with vt in (3) ,
is a form of the Wald test for exogeneity of Nt• That is, to test 
whether or not program size and approval rates are simultaneously 
,. 
determined, we need only test for the signi ficance of the residuals vt 
in (3) . In fact, it turns out that the null hYPothesis of exogeneity 
of Nt in easily rejected, so equation (1) does require this more 
elaborate treatment. Details of the estimation procedure and its 
properties may be found in Rivers and Vuong (1984) , 
4. Data 
As suggested section 1. CQ support scores are a poor measure 
of the size and success of the president's legislative program. They 
cannot account for size at all since the number of roll call votes is 
a function of congressional action and controversy, not of any 
underlying presidential program. CQ also compiles a "presidential 
boxscore" which would appear to provide a more satisfactory basis for 
a measure of presidential legislative succecess. Included in the 
boxscore are all presidential requests for legislation and 
congressional action taken on them by the end of each session. This 
list includes measures which received no congressional attention, as 
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well as those on which Congress votes (roll call or otherwise). This 
measure distinguishes a president who gets 80% of his program to the 
floor, one half of which passes, from one who gets 20% of his program 
to the floor, one half of which passes again. Under such 
circumstances the first president would receive a boxscore rating of 
40% and the second a boxscore rating of 1� despite support scores of 
5� for both. Figure 2 compares CQ support scores with our measure 
constructed from the CQ boxscore. 
Since CQ counts each detail of programs the president requests 
in public addresses letters to Congress, and other messages, the 
boxscores are not a perfect solution to the problem of measuring 
presidental success in Congress. If the president requests passage of 
a consumer protection bill, this is listed as one request. If, 
however, he details each section of a proposal--as did Eisenhower in 
1954 with his 19 revisions of the Taft-Hartley Act or Johnson's 18 
sections of campaign finance reform--each section will be counted 
separately. Support scores are also subject to the same shortcomings 
as almost any measure one could reasonably expect to create. These 
shortcomings include equal weighting of major and minor requests, the 
lack of differentiation between top presidential priorities and "off-
hand" requests, and the difficulty in determining whether the action 
taken by Congress constitutes approval or rejection of the president's 
position (e.g., if Congress �ppropriates $500 million for a project 
that the president requested $900 million for in a special message). 
In an earlier version of this paper we attempted to correct for the 
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first problem by grouping requests which were likely to be considered 
in one bill and which were in the same subject area (e. g., treating 
five proposals for small business investment assistance proposed in 
1972 by Nixon as one request). The results were not substantially 
different from those reported here using the ungrouped data. 
Since the method used by CQ to compute boxscores through 1953 
was not consistent with that employed during the remainder of the 
study period, 1954 was chosen as the first period of the estimation 
range. Similarly, the sample period ends in 1974 when CQ discontinued 
the boxscore series. 
Congressional party strength was measured by averaging the 
percent of the House and the percent of the Senate that belong to the 
president's party. Presidential popularity is the annual average 
percentage approving of the president's performance in the standard 
Gallup poll question, 
5. Estimation Results3 
Parameter estimates for Equations (1) and (2) are presented in 
Tables 1 and 2. Two versions of each equation were estimated, the 
first using the specification described in Section 4 and the second 
replacing the party or new administration dummies by administration 
dummies. 
For each percentage point the president increases the site of 
his program, the congressional approval rate falls between 0 . 26 %  and 
0. 33%. A president who presents Congress with a long laundry list of
proposals will tend to have a lower program approval rate than one 
TABLE 1 
TWO-STAGE CONDITIONAL MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES 
OF PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT EQUATION (1) 
Variable (l. lJ 
Constant 2. 017
(0. 730) 
log Nt -0. 832 (0. 178) 
POPt 0. 025(0. 016) 
PARTYt 0. 045(0. 006) 
dt 0. 084(0. 062) 
Eisenhower dullllily 
Kennedy/Johnson dummy 
p/av 1. 028(0,204) 
Log Likelihood -3715 
·Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. 
(1. 2) 
2. 333
(0. 411) 
-0,687 
(0. 090) 
0. 023
(0. 014) 
0. 038
(0,024) 
0. 105
(0. 069) 
-0.154 
(0. 065) 
0,637 
(0.160) 
-3666 
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with a smaller number of requests. A large program may still be 
rational presidential strategy since a lower approval rate for a 
larger number of requests may mean a greater absolute quantity of 
legislation is passed than for a higher approval rate for a smaller 
program. We should caution, however, that our analysis does not take 
into account presidential priorities. In presenting his program, the 
president may identify certain items as being more important than 
others and the chances of Congress approving these priority requests 
may not be affected by the introduction of further requests. 
The remaining coefficient estimates in equation (1) generally 
confirm our prior expectations. A new administration can expect a 
friendlier congressional response than an old one, though the 
di fference in approval rates is small (about 0. 3%) and insignificant. 
Congressional party strength is a much more important determinant of 
presidential influence in Congress: increases in the president's 
congressional party strength of one percent lead to an increase of 
almost two percent in the president's congressional approval rate. 
The president's Gallup approval rating shows a somewhat smaller 
(roughly half as strong as the party ef fect--about point for point 
increases), though still substantial effect--on the president's 
congressional approval rate. In interpreting these results, however, 
one should remember that Gallup approval ratings exhibit much greater 
variation than congressional party strength. Over the short run 
congressional party strength is fixed and midterm fluctuations of more 
than 10% are rare. From the president's point of view his personal 
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popularity might appear to be a more important source of influence in 
Congress. Finally, other things equal, Democratic presidents will 
generally fare much worse than their Republican counterparts, with 
approval rates 6 %  to 8% lower. Of course, other things are not equal. 
For most of the postwar period Democratic congressional party strength 
has been between 15% and 20% higher than Republican party strength. 
Our data indicate that a Democratic president with the usual 
Democratic congressional support (about 6 0%  party strength) can expect 
only slightly greater congressional approval rates than a minority 
Republican president (about 40% party strength). This undoubtedly 
reflects the heterogeneity of the Democratic coalition. The 
Democratic "majority" in Congress includes a substantial fraction of 
southern Democrats who may often act independently of party memebers 
from other regions. The more homogeneous Republican party is likely 
to offer stronger, more cohesive support for a Republican president. 
f:i.:ni'!lly1 :t..t :ts of particular interest that the exogeneity of Nt 
is easily rejected. This means that correlations between presidential 
success rates and program size (or any of the other variables) do not 
accurately reflect the underlying strategic interactions between 
president and Congress, Of course, our simple model hardly captures 
the full complexity of this relationship, but it does show that 
attempts to describe only presidential or congressional behavior in 
isolation are likely to be misleading. 
The main finding obtained from estimating equation (2), 
reported in Table 2, is that presidents behave strategically in 
Variable 
Constant 
i 1<1 - d ) t- t 
dt 
REP PRES 
Eisenhower dummy 
Kennedy/Johnson dummy 
TABLE 2 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF 
PROGRA1! SIZE EQUATION (2) 
(2.1) 
5.264 
(0.190) 
1.278 
(0.362) 
0.518 
(0.211) 
-0.549 
(0,085) 
0.828 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
(2.2) 
4.718 
(0.159) 
1.124 
(0.391) 
0.480 
(0.243) 
-0.116 
(0.112) 
0.618 
(0.108) 
0.840 
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setting the size of their programs. An increase in last years program 
passage rate of 1% leads to a 1.2% increase in program size the 
following year, other things being equal. Democratic administrations 
tend to submit much larger programs than Republican administrations 
with the typical Democratic president submitting over 50% more 
requests than a Republican president under the same conditions. In 
their first year, an administrations actually submits fewer requests 
than it otherwise would, though this is difficult to tell from the 
table (note that Yt_1(1 - dt) = O for new administrations; otherwise 
Y
t-l usually falls in the range of 0 . 5). This confirms the 
conventional wisdom that Democratic presidents tend to be activists 
and that it takes a new administration some time to put together a 
full program. 
Considered jointly, the equation estimates reveal an 
importanat simultaneity between presidential program formulation and 
congressional passage of the president's program. If they have any 
success in obtaining congressional passage of their programs, 
presidents then tend to submit a larger number of requests in 
subsequent years and receive, as a consequence, lower approval rates. 
Thus, bivariate correlations
. 
between a president's public prestige and 
congressional approval rates will understate the extent to which th�se 
factors are sources of presidential influence in Congress. 
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
The empirical analyses reported in the previous section 
indicate that, contrary to some earlier claims, public opinion is an 
important source of presidential influence in Congress. Simple 
correlational measures of the reationship between public support for 
the president or the president's congressional party strength and 
legislative success scores systematically understate the strength of 
this relationship. We have tried to put the study of presidential-
congressional relations on a firmer methodological footing by 
proposing a model that captures some of the complex behavioral 
processes in the formulation and passage of the president's program, 
collecting the relevant data, and estimating the model. 
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That presidential influence in Congress does in fact depend on 
the president's public standing is hardly a surprising discovery, 
though we think the inplications of this relationship for the way 
policy is made in the federal government have not been fully drawn 
out. The fixed electoral term of American presidents frequently gives 
rise to a situation unknown in parliamentary systems: a president 
loses public confidnece, his popularity falls to 30J. or less, and his 
program stalls in Congress, but a year or more still remains in his 
term. Short of impeachment, there is no way to remove a president in 
such circumstances. A leadership vacuum ensues. No other political 
figure occupies an institutional position sufficient to exercise 
policy leadership, 
Neustadt suggested that presidents closely guard their 
prestige and power to avoid these situations. While this is good 
advice for presidents, we. doubt that even "experienced politicians of 
extraordinary temperament" will solve what are more basic 
constitutional problems. Though our analyses show that presidential 
influence in Congress rises and falls with the president's public 
prestige, we do not think presidents will have much success in 
converting their personal popularity into congressional support. 
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The more ephemeral sort.of presidential popularity associated 
with charisma, personal trustworthiness, and similar qualities 
provides the president with little leverage on controversial policy 
issues. When asked why his Gallup poll rating had fallen from 71J1o to 
61J1o, John Kennedy, who understood these matters as well as anyone, 
commented: 
I think that if I were still at 79 percent after a very 
intense congressional session I would feel that I had not 
met my responsibilities. The American people are rather 
evenly divided on a great many issues, and as I make my 
views clearer on these issues, of course, some people 
increasingly are not going to approve of me. (quoted in 
Chase and Lerman, 1965: 292) 
When voters judge government performance a failure, they will not 
concern themselves very much with the president's personal qualities. 
A president with an ambitious program must count on successful 
performance to maintain his public support and buttress his influence 
in Congress. 
Yet is is when policy demands are greatest that the 
president's public standing is likely to be the lowest. The public 
tends to rally to the president's support in short crises, but after a 
long period of a slack economy or runaway inflation the president will 
have few defenders. There is one important exception to this pattern. 
A new administration will not be blamed for the previous 
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administrations' s failures. New presidents usually start their terms 
with great public prestige and Congress is more willing then to 
accomodate presidential requests. But transitions are difficult and 
the new administration needs some time to put together its program. 
Time, however, is one thing it doesn't have. The president's public 
support almost invariably falls and soon the previous 
administrations's failures become its own. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 . Namely, that the disturbance covariance matrix i s  diagonal so 
that the system of equations is recursive. 
2. The phrase is D.T. Campbell's (1958), The reference was kindly 
provided by Doug Price and Hayward Alker. 
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3. Variable effects are calculated by computing partial derivatives. 
In a probit equation,Prob(yt = llxt) = CJl(P'xt ), we have: 
ilProb(yt = llxt> _ 
� = Phd<P'xt>- 0.4pk v Xtk 
if we evaluate the normal density function d(') at P'xt = O. For 
an equation in semilog form, log Yt = P'xt, such as (2): 
Ayt 1 aYt _ a log Yt = p yt "yt ilxtk 
- ilxtk k 
where Ayt is the change induced by increasing xtk one unit. 
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